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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the issue of governance diversity of innovative semi wholesale SFSC such as multi stake-
holder platforms acting as middlemen between local producers and buyers (individual and collective ones) 
wishing to procure local products. We apply the new institutional economics approach with special attention to 
ownership rights allocation (Hansmann, 1988), collective decision-making (Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn, 2013) 
and associated transaction costs (Williamson, 1991; Menard, 2004; Chaddad, 2012). Those concepts were 
already used in analysis of various agri-businesses, cooperatives and their vertical relations in supply chains but 
little has been done in terms of SFSC. We rely on this framework to provide a comparative analysis of their 
governance structures based on a detailed description of the “horizontal” relations among stake-holders and 
“vertical” relations between the platforms and their suppliers and customers.  
 
1. Introduction 
Increased public interest and support to enhance the development of Short Food Supply Chains (SFSC) has 
been observed in last decade. For example, in institutional catering, many municipalities push toward the 
development of local procurement (Allain, 2015). Several new forms of SFSC have recently emerged that 
include technological and organizational innovations that try to meet this demand. Collective procurement 
platforms are one of this new form. Collective platforms act as middlemen to ease the match between the 
supply of local products and demand for these products coming from local retailers and (private and public) 
institutional catering. They do so by improving information for the buyers on the existing local products, 
adjusting supply and demand for local products, providing baskets of fresh products and so on. Collective 
platforms can be (and are) organized in many ways, from e-platforms matching supply and demand to 
collective organization owning some assets such as storage and logistic capacities. Given the innovative nature 
of these organizations, the key factors for their economic sustainability is still unclear.  
In this contribution, we argue that the governance of these platforms is a critical element of their economic 
sustainability and that SFSC scholars have not payed attention to these dimensions. Issues such as value 
creation and value sharing, allocation of decision rights over assets, incentive mechanisms are all important 
dimensions of the governance of these platforms to analyse in order to assess their potential success. The 
contribution of this paper is to analyse and explain the diversity of governance modes in collective platforms to 
assess their economic sustainability.   
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We build our analysis of the platforms organizational diversity on contributions in organizational economics 
such as Grossman and Hart (1986), Hansmann (1996) and Williamson (1985, 1991). Issues such as decision 
making, ownership allocation over relevant assets, value sharing becomes key elements of our investigation.  
In order to substantiate our analysis, we rely on a set of 6 case studies in the South West of France that 
effectively differ in their governance. They can be just market-like governance structures such as on-line 
platforms that match supply and demand, producer co-constructed initiatives with low or high public support 
or even structures created with private investments. We observe that type of support received by platforms 
affects their governance structure and decision-making tools that are potentially cornerstones of their 
sustainability. Economic organization of platforms strongly rely on managers: we observe that their role and 
competences in platforms differ. Additionally, also decisions on number of staff and their skills could affect 
their competitivity.  
 
2. Presentation of study cases  
The empirical study is based on a detailed description of six case studies of multi stake-holder platforms 
supplying local produce to a variety of customers (supermarkets, institutional public and private catering and 
others). Information was obtained with semi-structured interviews with managers, producers, some clients and 
internal documents such as the legal status of the organizations. 
Platforms are situated in 3 different departments in the same region (Table 1, Table 2). They differ in terms of 
potential market in public institutions, number of people and their net salary per month. Diverse agricultural 
surfaces and number of producers is observed in departments (Table 1). 
Table 1: Information about departments in which are platforms 
  Department 
  A B C 
N° of school 
children 
203555 32761 24871 
N° of people 1298562 228868 152684 
Net salary per 
month (€) 
2517 2151 2028 
Agricultural surface 
(ha) 
149030 127300 132200 
N° of producers 6760 5160 2660 
 
Our six study cases are briefly presented in Table 2. They have different operative mode from on-line service to 
give information on potential offer and demand, producers’ platforms in which producers are (partially) 
involved in decision-making. They were created recently, some very recently (A) and some more than 10 years 
ago (E). They differ in legal statutes and public support given from their creation on.  Most of them have all 
types of producer except one (E) with 100% of organic producers and their number vary. We can draw 
similarities with clients which differ in number and type of clients. They have chosen different market and 
supply areas. They have no boards or different numbers of people included in board of platforms. We can 
observe significant differences in full time employees and their gross sales. Even though initiatives are young, 
some of them have reached brake-even point, one is close and others quite far (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: General information of study cases 
Platform A B C D E F 
Bavec et al. / Proceedings in System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks 2017, 283-288 
285 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18461/pfsd.2017.1729 
Operative mode on-line producers' producers' producers' producers' private 
Year of creation 2015 2011 2012 2012 2004 2013 
Legal status association cooperative association association cooperative p° company 
Public support yes yes yes not anymore 
not 
anymore no 
N of producers 20 60 15 104 60 140 
Type of producers All All All All organic All 
N of clients 18 25 per week 50 60 per week 90 
5-30 per 
week 














Marketing area Department Department Department Regional Regional Regional 
Supplying area Department Department Department Regional Regional Regional 
N of people in board 0 18 18 20 
5 
consultants 0 
N of staff employed 
full time  0 2 1 3 2,85 12 
Gross sales Very low Low Low High High Very high 
Break-even point 
they have 
none far  far yes almost yes 
 
3. Empirical and theoretic considerations: towards analytical framework  
3.1 Research of short food supply chains 
Short Food Supply Chains (SFSC) face increased public interest and institutional support trying to enhance their 
development in recent years (Moustier and Loc, 2013; Renting, 2003; Marsden et al., 2000). The substantial 
progress has been made on SFCS empirical diversity, consumer’s perceptions and willingness to pay as well as 
possible effects on well-being of farmers and farm labour. Empirically, SFSC such as on-farm sales or 
community supported agriculture and others have been already broadly studied (Kneafsey et al., 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, the current SFSC literature has not yet paid much attention to the economic organization and 
governance of these SFSC (Tregear, 2011). We argue that, like for any forms of supply chains such as traditional 
ones, issues such as value creation and value sharing, allocation of decision rights over critical assets are 
cornerstones for their economic sustainability and possible scaling-up. Furthermore, these issues become even 
more critical in situations where these SFSC have a collective nature such as new forms called “the second 
generation SFSC” (Maye et al., 2013) that have not been broadly studied. These are enriched with new 




3.2 Framework for governance analysis 
Our description of the platforms’ governance relies on Williamson’s (1991) typology and framework. He 
provided a landmark contribution by disentangling alternative modes of governance based on different 
mechanisms such as incentive intensity, the level of administrative control and so on. We extend this 
framework with recent developments in organizational economics that are relevant to our empirical context. 
First, we borrow from contributions that emphasize the key role played by ownership allocation over assets to 
contrast alternative modes of organizations. Key contributions include work by Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Hansmann (1996). We also rely on recent developments that try to dig deeper in the governance of hybrid 
modes of organization (Ménard, 2004, Chaddad, 2012) as most of our cases are pretty good examples of hybrid 
Bavec et al. / Proceedings in System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks 2017, 283-288 
286 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18461/pfsd.2017.1729 
forms. Next, we also borrow from the literature on “members-controlled” organizations (such as producers’ 
cooperatives) in order to explicitly take into account the collective nature of many of our case studies Pozzobon 
and Zylbersztajn, 2013). Finally, as collective organizations, platforms have to simultaneously govern not one 
but a portfolio of interrelated transactions. “Vertical transactions”, namely the transactions between the 
platforms and both their customers and suppliers has to be coordinated with the “horizontal” dimension of this 
collective venture (the interactions among platforms’ members). Therefore, additional analyses are needed to 
better understand collective governance structures (Raynaud and Sauvée, 2000).  
 
 
4. Diversity of governance structures (biggest differences in 4 subclasses) 
We observe the biggest differences of platforms’ governances between the on-line platform (A), platforms with 
on-going long term public support since their creation (B,C), platforms without support that had it in first 3 
years after their creation (D,E) and the private platform (F). 
On-line platform (A) is very close to market-like (Williamson, 1991) governance mechanism where supply and 
demand are mostly coordinated through price and quality signal with no or few administrative governances. 
Producers and clients separately negotiate and sign contracts for different products. Platforms only difference 
in comparison with spot market transactions is that it offers information on potential producers and clients 
which reduces searching costs for potential transactors. Departments’ sponsored platform does not take 
commission or search profits and therefore have no gross sales or brake-even point. Because of recent creation 
in 2015, we will closely analyse its development in the future. 
Initiatives with long term public support (B, C) are situated in less populated departments and have chosen the 
restrained area of their department to organize their activities, while other platforms (except A, B, C) have 
overcome potential issue of insufficient market potential by enlarging their activities to regional scale.  The 
governance structure is primarily structured around board of platform that decide on major issues. Beside 
producers, local public authorities (like local chambers of agriculture) have included themselves in governing 
bodies as well as some other territorial actors that are interested in the platforms development because of 
their expected role to boost local agriculture. These 2 platforms have looser coordination with more reliance 
on public support as their managers are payed directly by public support and do not have necessarily the most 
suitable competences of managing. Those issues reflect interviews as stated by producers with lower 
implication of farmers in decision making and motivation for future cooperation. Both platforms are also 
struggling to become financially independent.  
Initiatives with limited support in the beginning (D, E) tend to form a crucial stable base of producers that are 
leading the coordination and implication of farmers. Therefore, their motivation for cooperation is bigger. They 
have the central role in platforms’ boards and all the critical decisions. The functioning of platforms, rules and 
partner selection are more strictly controlled by managers and employees. Producers have stated a high 
degree of trust in platforms and managers’ actions which gives them certain degree of freedom. They have 
more commercially oriented strategies of managers and development which reflect in faster economic 
independence of those initiatives which have already or almost break-even.   
Private platform (F) has tighter relationships with farmers which is formalized which contracts and strictly 
controlled by their employees. They have a big commercial power because of investment in staff. The 
governance structure is hierarchy like governance and is completely decided by manager/owner.  
 
5. Conclusion and future considerations 
The contribution of this paper is to give some insights about the diversity of governance 
modes in collective short food supply chains. We analysed 6 platforms supplying diversified 
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local produce to clients in semi-wholesale scale. We described their governance diversity 
using tools from the organizational economics which were already used in analysis of various 
agri-businesses, cooperatives and their vertical relations in supply chains but little has been 
done in terms of SFSC.  
Platforms take different forms of governances like on-line platform which is comparable to 
market transaction and private platform that have some hierarchy-like elements of 
governance. In between we can observe hybrid forms of governance of platforms that can 
be affected by their public support or bigger producer’s implication in governance structure. 
There are some potential signs that different governance structures affect platforms 
sustainability but it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions due to their recent creation.  
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